[1Bandits with concave rewards and convex knapsacks, Shipra Agrawal and Nikhil R. Devanur

Introduces and gives polynomial-time near-optimal algorithms for a general model for bandit exploration-exploitation. The algorithm is an extension of the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm for the multi-armed bandits problem. The new framework allows them to give more efficient algorithms for other problems such as Blackwell approachability, online convex optimization and conditional-gradient/projection-free/Frank-Wolfe algorithm.

[2Managing congestion in decentralized matching markets, Nick Arnosti, Ramesh Johari and Yash Kanoria

Shows that in decentralized two-sided markets with asynchronous arrivals and departures and no information about seller availability, limited seller visibility can improve general welfare.

[3Optimising Trade-offs Among Stakeholders in Ad Auctions, Yoram Bachrach, Sofia Ceppi, Ian Kash, Peter Key and David Kurokaw

Optimizes linear combinations of the utilities of competing stakeholders (auctioneer, user, advertiser) in ad auctions using a generalized second-price (GSP) auction with per-click reserve prices.

[4Multiplicative Bidding in Online Advertising, MohammadHossein Bateni, Jon Feldman, Vahab Mirrokni and Sam Chiu-wai Wong

Establishes the optimization problem behind multiplicative bidding, a bid adjustment technique used by many search engines. They also study the complexity of approximating the solution and give algorithms under various assumptions.

[5Why Marketplace Experimentation is Harder than it Seems: The Role of Test-Control Interference, Dominic Coey and Thomas Blake

Discusses role of and conditions for test-control (A/B) interference in determining the effectiveness of marketplace campaigns

[6Incentivized Optimal Advert Assignment via Utility Decomposition, Frank Kelly, Peter Key and Neil Walton

Kelly extends his primal-dual optimization framework (originally introduced for communication networks) to formulate a network utility maximization framework for platform and advertisers together. The mechanism introduced is also incentive compatible.

[7The Complexity of Fairness through Equilibrium, Abraham Othman, Christos Papadimitriou and Aviad Rubinstein

Discusses the complexity of approximating Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Income (CEEI, a particular market clearing mechanism that offers efficiency, feasibility and fairness. In short, approximating CEEI in general is hard.

[8Asymptotically Truthful Equilibrium Selection in Large Congestion Games, Ryan Rogers and Aaron Roth

For congestion games with large number of players and incomplete information, this paper introduces mechanism that guarantees a Nash equilibrium improving on previous mechanisms that could only guarantee correlated equilibrium.

[9Neutrality and Geometry of Mean Voting, Sébastien Lahaie and Nisarg Shah

Integrates the neutrality axiom into mean proximity framework for voting to achieve consensus amongst agents, and shows that the new axiom allows a more compact representation for every mean proximity rule.


A complete list of papers is available here.